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Rancièrean Atomism 
Clarifying the Debate between Jacques Rancière and 
Alain Badiou 
Joseph M. Spencer 
Brigham Young University  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, perhaps due in part to the 1975 
republication of Gaston Bachelard’s Les Intuitions Atomistiques,1 Louis 
Althusser and his former student, Alain Badiou, found they had things to 
say about the relevance of ancient atomism to radical leftist politics. For both 
thinkers, whose shared debt to Bachelard had been openly avowed, the 
question that needed addressing concerned the relationship between 
atomism and structuralism. On Badiou’s account, atomism canonically 
encapsulates the “structural dialectic,” a dialecticized form of structuralism 
that retains from Hegel only the mystical shell, passing over the rational 
kernel.2 On Althusser’s account, however, atomism laid the foundations of a 
tradition of “aleatory materialism,” an entirely non-Hegelian and non-
structuralist materialism that captures the experience of political revolt.3 But 
because Althusser was in his last years (his writings on atomism would only 
be published after his death) and because Badiou was on the verge of a 
major transformation (his polemics against atomism would disappear as he 
developed the theses of Being and Event), the debate of sorts between master 
and student fell quickly to the wayside and has been largely ignored.4 
 Interestingly, another of Althusser’s students would attempt in the 
late 1980s to venture, somewhat belatedly and quite subtly, into the same 
conversation regarding atomism. In his remarkable book, The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation, Jacques Rancière draws 
on atomistic imagery in order, like Badiou, to frame the forms of political 
thought that he criticizes and rejects.5 Less concerned than Badiou about 
deciding on the importance of Marx’s Hegelian commitments or on the 
status of structuralism vis-à-vis politics, Rancière nonetheless takes up 
atomism as providing an outline of a sort of materialism that ultimately 
proves itself inadequate to the demands of politics. At the same time, 
Rancière and Badiou interpret the implications of atomism in profoundly 
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distinct ways. It is in fact possible to see in Rancière’s oblique discussion of 
atomism in The Ignorant Schoolmaster a similarly oblique criticism of Badiou’s 
relationship to atomism, linking it to his more overt critical studies of 
Badiou published more recently. My chief aim in this paper, then, is to cast 
passages from The Ignorant Schoolmaster in which Rancière draws on and 
alludes to ancient atomism as points of important contact—and therefore of 
conflict—between Rancière and Badiou. Looking carefully at the differences 
between these two thinkers’ respective investigations of the relevance of 
atomism to political thought allows their larger differences, both political 
and philosophical in nature, to be fixed more clearly. 
 My thesis is twofold. First, I argue that what Badiou and Rancière 
most obviously share in their assessments of atomism (and this links both of 
their treatments of atomism to Althusser’s as well) is a negative judgment 
regarding the post-swerve constitution of the world, while what most 
obviously distinguishes their positions is their differing judgments 
regarding the pre-swerve rain of the atoms in the void—which Badiou 
assesses negatively and Rancière positively. Becoming quite clear both about 
how Badiou and Rancière respond to what comes before and after the 
atomistic swerve, I argue, helps to clarify an implicit response on Rancière’s 
part to what has become Badiou’s chief objection to Rancière’s political 
theory, namely, that Rancière’s conception of a “community of equals” is 
without intelligible content.6 Second, I argue that the fact that Badiou 
assesses both what comes before and what comes after the swerve as 
negative, while Rancière assesses only what comes after the swerve as 
negative (because he assesses the pre-swerve rain of the atoms in the void 
positively), makes clear that their most essential point of difference concerns 
the status of the swerve that mediates between before and after. Working 
through the complexities of Badiou’s analysis of the swerve and uncovering 
Rancière’s extremely subtle analysis of the swerve, I argue, helps to clarify a 
major aspect of what has become Rancière’s chief criticism of Badiou’s 
conception of philosophy, namely that Badiou’s approach to philosophy 
requires that there be masters and therefore intellectual inequality.7 
 My primary intention here, then, is to become clearer about the 
dispute between Badiou and Rancière by putting a finer point principally on 
Rancière’s contributions to that dispute, both his (implicit) response to 
Badiou’s critique and his (explicit) criticism of Badiou’s project.8 I will 
address these two points respectively in the second and third parts of this 
essay. In a first part, preceding the presentation of my arguments for my two 
theses, I will clarify the basic political stakes of Rancière’s The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster, outlining the basic question to which his treatment of atomism 
is meant to serve as productive response. 
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Education and Politics 
 The Ignorant Schoolmaster traces the adventures of Joseph Jacotot, the 
key figure for Rancière of the French workers’ movement of the nineteenth 
century. Rancière often mentioned Jacotot in his early writings, and it was 
arguably in Jacotot’s “Me too, I’m a painter!” that the seeds of Rancière’s 
celebrated work on aesthetics are to be found.9 From 1818 until his death in 
1840, Jacotot was the defender of a radical program of education, “universal 
teaching,” which proposed to put directly into the hands of the ignorant the 
means of their own emancipation. Much of The Ignorant Schoolmaster is 
dedicated to situating Jacotot’s pedagogical radicalism, to revealing the 
important ways in which it grew out of and alongside certain developments 
of its era but more especially the essential ways in which it worked against 
the spirit of the times. The point of the book, it thus seems, is principally to 
contest certain approaches to questions of education. After all, the 
significance of the student uprisings of 1968, in which Rancière himself 
participated, was at stake. Althusser’s appropriation of the student 
movement for his own work on ideology, Pierre Bourdieu’s deeply 
influential seminars and publications on education, and even Jean-François 
Lyotard’s investigation of the French educational apparatus all constituted 
rival visions of the status of education in France in the wake of May 1968.10 
Rancière’s work on Jacotot’s career would seem to have been his 
intervention in this larger conversation. 
 The educational emphases throughout The Ignorant Schoolmaster 
notwithstanding, the chief aim of the book is arguably more directly political 
in nature. Rancière has himself described his work from the late 1970s 
through the early 1990s as aimed first and foremost at “understand[ing] the 
power pertaining to a few words, words like ‘proletarian’ and 
‘emancipation,’” real clarity concerning which words he found especially in 
the writings of and controversy surrounding Jacotot and his radical 
pedagogy.11 In universal teaching he found, as he did in other, less directly 
educational pursuits among nineteenth-century French workers, “the 
singular phenomenon of a production of meaning that is neither the 
consciousness of an avant-garde instructed by science nor the systemization 
of ideas born out of the practice of the masses.”12 In short, what Rancière 
works out in The Ignorant Schoolmaster is less concerned with directly 
intervening in the crisis of the education systems of the West than with 
contesting the working assumption of so much of leftist politics: the idea 
that ideological superstructures demand the formation of a leftist intellectual 
elite who have the task of distinguishing ideology from science and so of 
setting workers on the right path to material emancipation. 
 The political ramifications of The Ignorant Schoolmaster begin to 
materialize really only in the fourth and fifth of Rancière’s five “lessons in 
intellectual emancipation,” though the third lesson lays the groundwork for 
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the elaboration of those ramifications. That third lesson makes two essential 
moves. First, it sets forth in outline a basic epistemology. Truth as such—
rigorously distinguished from mere facts, observable states of affairs—“is a 
whole, and language fragments it; it is necessary, and languages are 
arbitrary.”13 Because “there is no code given by divinity, no language of 
languages,”14 human beings, as speaking animals, are condemned always 
and only to be “circling around the truth, from fact to fact, relation to 
relation, sentence to sentence.”15 Those who know their own intellectual 
capacity—and who consequently know it to be equal to that of every other 
human being—assume a position in orbit around the truth.16 This image of 
being in orbit sums up the whole of Rancière’s epistemology, and, as will 
become clearer, it lies at the heart of his interest in atomism. Already in the 
third lesson, Rancière uses—rather subtly, and in a way that will have to be 
clarified later—the language of atomism in connection with his talk of being 
in orbit: “One can say, if one likes, that truth brings together. But what 
brings people together, what unites them, is nonaggregation. . . . People are 
united because they are people, that is to say, distant beings,” each pursuing 
its own orbit.17 
 The second move Rancière makes in the third lesson of The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster concerns what he calls “one of the canonical exercises of 
universal teaching”: that of improvisation.18 This exercise draws deeply on 
the epistemology just described, since it makes of all communication—as 
Jacotot himself put it—“a kind of perpetual improvisation.”19 As Rancière 
explains: “The impossibility of our saying the truth, even when we feel it, 
makes us speak as poets, makes us tell the story of our mind’s adventures 
and verify that they are understood by other adventurers.”20 All human 
communication, according to Rancière, amounts to a poetic or artistic 
gesture: not a transmission of knowledge, but a narrativization of one’s orbit 
around the truth. This understanding of the implications of his basic 
epistemological picture allows Rancière to make his first strictly political 
gesture in The Ignorant Schoolmaster: “We can thus dream of a society of the 
emancipated that would be a society of artists.”21 Where there exists a 
community of those who assume on the part of all their companions equal 
intellectual capacity, there exists a community of artists, all of them bent on 
improving their expressive ability so as to tell others of their own 
adventures in orbit about the truth. In such a community, however small, 
Rancière finds the seeds of collective emancipation—of a nonaggregated 
community of equals, to use again in a preliminary way the language of 
atomism introduced just above. 
 These two moves—outlining a nonrationalist epistemology and 
drawing its implications for the nature of human communication—lay the 
foundation for the heavy political focus of the fourth and fifth lessons of The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster. Here it will have to suffice to focus principally on the 
fourth lesson, which is where Rancière’s allusions to atomism appear in 
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concentrated form.22 There again Rancière focuses on drawing consequences 
from the epistemological picture presented in the third lesson. If truth does 
not decide in any direct way on debates among human beings regarding the 
reasons for relatively straightforward observable facts, it certainly “settles no 
conflict in the public place.”23 Among observable facts, there is the fact of 
the social order—with all the equities or inequities one wishes to find in it—
but there is no possible way to know, directly, that the present order either is 
or is not the true order of things. As Rancière summarily puts this point, 
“there is no political science, no politics of truth.”24 As a result, 
conservatives and progressives alike confuse politics with the production 
and the maintenance of the social order. Better, they confuse community with 
social order and make that confusion the founding axiom of all their political 
theories. For Rancière, however, political engagement just is the work of 
maintaining the distinction between a community and a social order.25 
 What is at issue here is a political practice, a perpetual enactment of 
community such that it cannot be reduced to any social order. This Rancière 
makes perfectly clear at the conclusion of the fourth lesson: “There cannot be 
a class of the emancipated, an assembly or a society of the emancipated. But 
any individual can always, at any moment, be emancipated and emancipate 
someone else, announce to others the practice and add to the number of 
people who know themselves as such.”26 Community, as Rancière conceives 
it, never crystallizes in a stable or even a semi-stable order without thereby 
canceling community. Community remains only so long as those making it 
up continue in motion, in their non-hierarchical but also non-identical orbits 
about the truth. If the anarchic performance of community ceases, it is 
always because order is restored, but order excludes the rational chaos of 
performance.27 To the individual engaged in the anarchic performance of 
community, Rancière—following Jacotot on this point carefully—gives the 
name of “man,” while to the individual placed within the order of a stable or 
semi-stable society he gives the name of “citizen.” Thus Rancière can 
position himself against those political thinkers who regard the citizen as 
“the ideal man, the inhabitant of an egalitarian political heaven that masks 
the reality of the inequality between concrete individuals.”28 He argues 
instead that “there is no equality except between men,” while considering 
the citizen to be “man fallen into the land of inequality.”29 
 Of course, Rancière fully concedes that social orders prevail, that any 
given collection of human beings inevitably organizes itself as a society and 
thereby attempts to exclude the genuinely communal gesture. Unlike certain 
other thinkers of political performance or performativity, however, he does 
not therefore speak of a coming community, of something that must dawn 
only when social orders and their associated hierarchies at last crumble. 
Instead, he speaks of community as something that is already actual in all 
kinds of ways at any given moment and as something that can be actualized 
in all kinds of other ways at any given moment. Any act of genuine equality 
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enacts community at least for a certain time. But it remains the case that any 
individual, however much she might enact equality and community in 
certain registers, always finds herself also and at the same time enmeshed in 
social hierarchies. For this reason, according to Rancière, every reasonable 
individual, being at once “man” and “citizen,” has the task of “submit[ting] 
to the madness of being a citizen, while trying to safeguard his reason.”30 
This one does, Rancière argues, by regarding the social order not as a matter 
of truth or of reason, but rather as a kind of mystery: “He will consider the 
social order a mystery situated beyond reason’s power, the work of a 
superior reason that requires the partial sacrifice of his own. He will submit 
himself as citizen to that which the irrationality of governments requires, 
refusing only to adopt the reasons given by it.”31 The political task for the 
individual is to resist total dissolution into the strong acid of the social order, 
to retain a certain element of indissoluble equality in the midst of the 
networks of inequality. 
 Now, in light of this discussion, one might distinguish two political 
imperatives issued by Rancière to his readers, one directed specifically to 
individual persons (a kind of Rancièrean “Know thyself!”) and the other 
directed specifically to cooperative or collective endeavors (a kind of 
Rancièrean ethics of institutionality). For the individual, the political 
mandate is to resist being dissolved into the social order without leaving 
behind the precipitate of engagement in a genuine community of equals. For 
the cooperative or collective endeavor, the political mandate is to resist the 
almost inevitable crystallization of every community into a social order that 
cancels the entropic movement of a mobile solution. Of course, the chemical 
images I have used in formulating these two imperatives conflict with one 
another, since the first figures dissolution as what must be resisted (through 
precipitation) but the second figures dissolution as what must be sustained 
(against crystallization). That is, in each of the images a certain antagonism 
between the mobility of a liquid and the rigidity of a solid plays a central 
role, but liquid mobility in the one figures the irrationality of every social 
order while in the other it figures the anarchy of every community of equals. 
Perhaps, in a general way, this conflict between images underscores the 
instability or ambiguity of every image, marking what might well be 
considered the danger of using chemical—that is, atomistic—imagery to 
figure concrete political claims. Yet, in a more specific way, this conflict 
between images helps to fix quite productively the essential distinction 
Rancière draws in organizing his political thought. Irrationality, a feature of 
every social order with its inequities, must be distinguished rigorously from 
anarchy, a feature of every community of equals. If community and social 
order are to be rigorously distinguished, it is necessary first to distinguish 
rigorously irrationality and anarchy. 
 Crucially, Rancière uses highly specific and carefully developed 
imagery to make these distinctions in full rigor: that of atomism. And, just as 
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crucially, he does so without introducing any conflict, however instructive, 
into his use of the relevant images. With relevant preliminary considerations 
out of the way, it is possible now to turn directly to Rancière’s uses of 
atomism in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, and to develop the ways in which 
those uses serve to clarify what has since become an ongoing debate—both 
philosophical and political—between Rancière and Alain Badiou. 
Before and After 
 In passages mentioned above, the first way in which Rancière draws 
on the imagery of atomism has already made an appearance. By criticizing 
the notion that “truth brings together” and by arguing instead on behalf of 
“nonaggregation,”32 Rancière begins his assessment of atomism by figuring 
the constituted world(s) of the atomists as something negative. To the extent 
that the most ancient of the atomists were cosmologists like so many of their 
pre-Socratic companions, the first motivation for their doctrine was to 
account for the world as experienced by human beings—that is, in its 
relative (but nonetheless dynamic) consistency. There is no evidence in the 
extant fragments of the most ancient atomists that they were particularly 
dissatisfied with the present constitution of the world, but they nonetheless 
rejected the idea of the world’s necessity.33 This move alone provided Louis 
Althusser, Badiou’s and Rancière’s common master (against whom each 
rebelled in his own way), with motivation enough to find political relevance 
in the atomistic cosmology.34 The sheer conviction that the world need not 
be as it is, whether or not such an ontology is rightly coupled with the 
political convictions and militant commitments that would help to alter the 
world, makes the atomists relevant to any thinker searching for an adequate 
Marxist ontology. Rancière, along with Althusser and also Badiou, can be 
said to develop the atomist suspicion regarding the necessity of the 
constituted cosmos into a fully negative assessment of every constituted 
social order. Because a social order is what can only be arbitrary, the social 
order can productively be thought along the lines of the atomists’ 
constituted cosmos. 
 At first, however, Rancière presents the social order less exactly as the 
constituted cosmos of the atomists’ ontology than as the result of every 
materialization of intelligence—every reduction, for instance, of minds to 
brains.35 Drawing on a passage from a posthumously published essay by 
Jacotot simply titled “Politics,” Rancière argues that the secret to sustaining 
the act by which emancipation is effected is to ensure that intelligences are 
not “submit[ted] . . . to the laws of any grouping, [namely] those of 
matter.”36 (The key sentence from Jacotot’s text is as follows: “In matter, a 
unique force, gravity, animates mass and molecules; but in the class of 
intellectual beings, intelligence directs individuals alone; their union is 
subject to the laws of matter.”)37 In language woven of both atomist imagery 
and the imagery of the orbit of an intelligence around the truth, Rancière 
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claims that whenever the spiritual intelligence is treated as a material thing, 
“the free orbit of each intelligence around the absent star of the truth, the 
distant flight of free communication on the wings of the word, is found to be 
thwarted, diverted by universal gravitation toward the center of the material 
universe.”38 Here, following Jacotot, Rancière claims that the aggregation of 
atoms of intelligence in a social order can happen only when one makes of 
“each intellectual unity” something “necessarily inert and without 
intelligence.”39 At least at first, what receives such a strongly negative 
assessment from Rancière seems not to be simply the atomists’ constituted 
cosmos, the coherence of a systematic order, but rather the whole of 
atomism’s materialist commitments, its reduction of all things to mere 
matter. To the extent that atomism commits one to the reduction of every 
spiritual principle (such as intelligence or mind) to materiality, it would 
seem to work against the deepest commitments of Rancière’s project. To that 
same extent, then, it would seem that Rancière assesses negatively not only 
the constituted worlds of which the atomists spoke, but also atomism as a 
whole. 
 If this were the case, it would prove far more difficult than it actually 
is to place Badiou and Rancière in productive conversation on atomism. As 
it turns out, however, Rancière does not dismiss materialism per se, despite 
what might be suggested by his approving quotation of Jacotot’s words. 
Rather, and fascinatingly, he presses into service not only Jacotot’s words 
quoted above, which suggest that atomism’s materialist commitments leave 
little room for the flight of intelligence, but also another passage from 
elsewhere in Jacotot’s corpus (specifically in a book on law or right) where 
atomistic imagery is used more affirmatively.40 There, in a chapter entitled 
“And,” Jacotot again argues that “there is nothing of reason” in matter, “and 
there cannot be any.”41 But he there nonetheless explores in a thought 
experiment what might be said of collectives of material “human 
corpuscles” if they “were reasonable.”42 Jacotot argues that, “then, under a 
unique impulsion, nations and the human species would follow a uniformly 
straight line, smoothly, without deviation, without aberration.”43 This image 
derives unmistakably from ancient atomism, particularly as it developed 
under the influences of Epicurus and then Lucretius. For these ancient 
atomists the atoms in the void initially fall in straight parallel lines, whereas 
for their predecessors the atoms initially move circularly in great vortices.44 
Jacotot seems to suggest that, to whatever extent it might be possible to 
conceive of materialized intelligences without condemning them to the 
aggregating force that produces social order, ancient atomism can be 
accommodated. 
 This Rancière takes over from Jacotot, and it allows him the possibility 
of embracing materialism without compromising his political doctrine. More 
importantly, perhaps, it leads him to assess one part of the atomists’ picture 
quite positively even as he—along with Althusser and Badiou—assesses 
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another part of the same picture quite negatively. While it is necessary to 
criticize the social order, figured by the atomists’ constituted cosmos, it is 
possible to draw approvingly on the rain of the atoms in the void that, 
according to certain of the ancient atomists, preceded the constitution of the 
cosmos. And in that image Rancière seems to find a particularly well-suited 
figure for his community of equals. In the undeviating fall of the atoms 
downward in the infinite void, none of them swerving to create the series of 
collisions that ultimately produce the ordered cosmos, Rancière sees what 
might be the best and most productive image of individual intelligences, 
each in her unique orbit about the absent star of truth. 
 It is thus that Rancière—unlike others—provides a positive assessment 
of what comes before the constitution of the cosmos in the atomist picture, 
even as he—like others—provides a negative assessment of what comes 
after the constitution of the cosmos in the same picture. (Importantly, 
Rancière has more recently made the same move, albeit slightly more 
implicitly, in a brief use of the language of atomism to critique every social 
order.)45 And it is in this distribution of positive and negative assessments 
that Rancière’s approach to atomism can be said to differ most clearly from 
that of Alain Badiou. Whether it would be appropriate to assume that 
Rancière wrote out his brief comments on atomism in The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster in direct response to Badiou’s discussion of atomism in Theory of 
the Subject, the latter appearing in print some five years before the former, 
much can be learned from bringing the two into conversation. To do so, it 
will of course be necessary to say at least a few things about Badiou’s 
approach to atomism. 
 For Badiou in the late 1970s—that is, before he struck on the pathway 
that led to his fully mature project, the first installment of which appeared 
the year after the publication of The Ignorant Schoolmaster46—atomism 
provides the outline of what he calls the structural dialectic, to be 
distinguished from the materialist dialectic.47 Both of these dialectics he 
finds operative in Hegel, with the structural dialectic there compromising 
again and again the materialist dialectic. The chief aim of the whole first half 
of Theory of the Subject is to disentangle the materialist dialectic from the 
structural dialectic so as to provide both Marxist theory and Marxist practice 
with needed clarity after the dissipation of French Maoism. The chief 
distinction between the two dialectics, on Badiou’s account, is that the 
materialist dialectic organizes the logic of a periodizing history, of a history of 
successive epochs of struggle between strongly contradictory terms, while 
the structural dialectic organizes the logic of a circular history, of a history 
that culminates in restoring and then securing a pre-dialectical indifference 
between the terms that set the dialectic in motion.48 In commenting on 
atomism, then, Badiou aims to show how it models the manner in which the 
structural dialectic systematically reworks the core contradiction underlying 
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the materialist dialectic in order to establish, to pursue, and finally to arrive 
at a totalized and totalizing end. 
 Essential to Badiou’s conception of the materialist dialectic is its 
rootedness in contradiction, in the sort of irreparable contradiction that 
disallows the teleological closure of a dialectical process and therefore 
grounds a strictly periodizing history. For such a contradiction to obtain, 
according to Badiou, some asymmetrical correlation between two distinct 
terms must exist. Moreover, the difference between the two terms must be 
strong (that is, “one of the terms affirms itself only by destroying the other”), 
the correlation between them must be processual (that is, the two terms 
must engage in “the struggle of opposites”), and the asymmetry must be 
capable of inversion (that is, “the essence-in-becoming of the asymmetry is 
the inversion, not the invariance, of position”).49 Strong difference, 
processual correlation, and reversible asymmetry together make up 
contradictions of the sort that set material dialectics in motion. And, 
interestingly, they can all three be found, on Badiou’s account, in the parallel 
rain of the atoms in the void before the deviation that leads to the 
constitution of the ordered cosmos. The atomists, as thinkers of how the rain 
of the atoms could be interrupted so that a (relatively) stable world could 
come into being, were those who accounted for the possibility of 
dismantling contradiction by canceling the strong difference between terms 
that grounds contradiction as such. They sought the means to “bring back a 
strong (qualitative) difference to its bare bones, the weak difference, or the 
difference of position, which undergirds it,” so that whatever asymmetrical 
correlation might still hold has no material force in the dialectic.50 
 The way I have summarized Badiou’s account of atomism to this point 
might sound as if he were approving of the parallel rain of the atoms in the 
void, perhaps in something like the way that Rancière, following Jacotot, 
assesses that pre-cosmic situation positively. There, before the erection of a 
(relatively) stable cosmos, Badiou finds strong contradiction and, therefore, 
all the trappings of the materialist dialectic. The situation is more 
complicated, however. Badiou indeed does find the founding contradiction 
of a materialist dialectic operative in the rain of the atoms in the void, but—
as I will have to make fully clear in the next section of this paper—he also 
finds there a certain lack of torsion necessary to founding a fully adequate 
Marxist ontology. It is ultimately elsewhere in the atomist picture that 
Badiou locates the figure for radical politics. 
 How, though, does Badiou find contradiction figured in the parallel 
rain of the atoms in the void, before the transformation that leads eventually 
to the constitution of a cosmos? Simply put, he turns to Hegel’s Science of 
Logic. Of course, strong difference is not difficult to locate in atomism, with 
or without Hegel, who speaks of the “complete externality” of atoms and 
void to one another.51 In a similar vein, Badiou simply asks, “What 
difference can be stronger than the one between atoms and the void”—
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between “the discrete multiplicity of matter” and “the infinite continuity of 
the nothing”?52 What Badiou draws from Hegel, rather, is the idea that in 
the ancient atomists themselves can be found a processual correlation and a 
reversible asymmetry in addition to strong difference. Left in their 
“complete externality” to one another, atoms and the void would be 
strongly different from each other but never in contradiction. But Hegel 
understood the atomists, since they “derive[ed] the infinite variety of the 
world” from a “simple antithesis,” to have seen some kind of dialectical 
interplay at work between atoms and void.53 The key, as Badiou notes, is to 
see that “the void engenders the movement of the atoms.”54 In Hegel’s own 
words, the ancient atomists worked out “a speculative determination” by 
finding in the void “the source of movement, which is an entirely different 
relation of the atom and the void from the mere juxtaposition and mutual 
indifference of these two determinations.”55 That is, as Hegel puts it, “the 
void is [for the atomists] the ground of movement only as the negative 
relation of the one [the void] to its negative [the atoms].”56 The negative, the 
motor of the Hegelian dialectic, organizes the relationship between the 
atoms and the void of ancient atomist thought, such that some kind of 
dialectic—with processual correlation and reversible asymmetry—operated 
in their cosmology. 
 But if Badiou finds full-blooded contradiction at work in the pre-
cosmic rain of the atoms in the void, why does he not assess it quite 
positively, perhaps finding in it a figure for, say, mass movements, to which 
he gives so much attention in Theory of the Subject? Given his proclivity for 
finding in formal thought figures for political experiences, might he not 
argue that the rain of the atoms in the void figures the march of so many 
clear-sighted militants that eventually, only when deviations to the right and 
to the left intervene and slow the march of the mass movement, coalesces 
into state-bound consensus? Importantly, Badiou makes no such move. And 
even before coming to a fuller clarification of this point in the next section of 
this paper, it is possible to identify something of what the pre-cosmic 
situation of the atoms lacks for Badiou. He puts the point this way: “This 
‘movement’ [in parallel in the void] is perfectly null, for lack of a reference 
point with which to mark it—the simultaneous and isotropic vection of an 
infinity of atoms, without the shadow of a doubt, being equivalent to their 
absolute immobility. Once again, nothing happens.”57 In other words, the 
undeviating fall of the atoms in the void, “all mov[ing] together eternally 
and according to parallel trajectories at variable speeds,”58 is a figure for 
mere nature bereft of any event—nature prior to or apart from the torsion of 
history that would fully realize what in it remains only potentially 
dialectical.59 Like Rancière, Badiou refuses to assess positively the congealed 
worlds with which the atomist cosmology concludes its story, but unlike 
Rancière, he finds in the essentially history-less or non-evental pre-cosmic 
rain of the atoms in the void something equally unsatisfying. 
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 Where Badiou assesses both the pre-cosmic and the cosmic moments 
of atomism negatively, each for distinct reasons, Rancière assesses only the 
cosmic moment of atomism negatively, reserving the possibility of 
appropriating approvingly the pre-cosmic moment for his own purposes. 
This constitutes the clearest, the most overt difference between Badiou and 
Rancière on atomism. What makes this an important and especially 
interesting point, however, is the fact that Rancière’s interest in the pre-
cosmic rain of the atoms in parallel in the void, at least as an instructive 
figure, can be read as providing him with a ready answer to what has 
become Badiou’s most consistent critique of Rancière’s political theory. 
According to Badiou, Rancière’s notion of a community of equals, 
irreducible to any social order, is bereft of content. In his own words, “the 
theme of the community of equals . . . suggests either a totality without 
master . . . or an equality which is held together under a pure empty mark of 
mastery, whose vertical absence provides the foundation for the horizontal 
bond.”60 At best, according to Badiou, this notion entails “the idea of a 
shared mastery without a master position.”61 But Rancière’s image of the 
community of equals as so many atoms falling in parallel in the void clarifies 
that what is at issue in his conception is not a horizontal bond but a parallel of 
trajectories. 
 Moreover, because Rancière provides, in The Ignorant Schoolmaster 
especially, a strictly delineated operation (a “device,” Rancière calls it) by 
which such parallel trajectories are launched,62 and because that operation 
employs a clearly defined “master position” and the conditions of its 
occupation, Badiou seems simply wrong to claim that Rancière works with 
“the idea of a shared mastery without a master position.” Rancière describes 
Jacotot’s students as having “learned without a master explicator, but not, 
for all that, without a master.”63 Although it would be distracting here to 
pursue the details at length, it must be said that the figure of the ignorant 
schoolmaster—or, reflecting the French somewhat more directly, the 
ignorant master—allows Rancière to construct the concept of a community 
of equals without appealing to any such self-canceling conception as Badiou 
attributes to him.64 And this point is not without its atomist bearings. Late in 
The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Rancière compares the operation of the ignorant 
master to an electric charge between otherwise distant atoms, the effect of 
which is to launch the atoms in their undeviating parallel trajectories. Those 
who pursue intellectual emancipation “may awaken that entirely new 
energy that fascinated lovers of liberty, that power without gravity or 
agglomeration that is propagated in a flash by the contact between two 
poles. Whoever forsakes the workings of the social machine has the 
opportunity to make the electrical energy of emancipation circulate.”65 
 There is thus much that Badiou seems to miss in Rancière’s conception 
of the community of equals. And it is significant that what most tellingly 
helps to clarify that conception derives from Rancière’s investment in certain 
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atomistic images. But this point can be developed further by turning to a 
more subtle point of distinction between Badiou and Rancière as regards 
atomism, one that marks their distance more radically. 
Between 
 As ancient atomism developed from Leucippus and Democritus to 
Epicurus and Lucretius, attention came to focus on exactly how the pre-
cosmic motion of the atoms gives way to the process of agglomeration that 
brings a cosmos into being. While, chiefly because of the way Rancière 
draws on atomism, the focus in this essay has to this point been on the 
“before” and the “after” of the atomist cosmology, the “between” of 
transformation deserves attention. As noted before, Badiou finds the atomist 
picture politically productive not in the pre-cosmic motion of the atoms but 
elsewhere, thus distinguishing his approach from Rancière’s. But where he 
finds the atomists to have fixed something of genuine political importance is 
in the so-called swerve, the deviation of some atom or atoms from its or their 
otherwise straight trajectory in the void. It is this rather than the rain of the 
atoms that he takes as a figure for “the mass movement,” which catalyzes 
“the evental concatenation that is called history.”66 For his part, however, 
Rancière seems at first to say more or less nothing about the swerve, taking 
the sheer difference between the constituted cosmos (as figure for the 
constituted social order) and the pre-cosmic rain of the atoms (as figure for 
the community of equals) to be sufficient to illustrate the stakes of his 
political theory. A closer look, however, reveals that Rancière does indeed 
have something to say about the swerve, albeit in the form of a negative 
assessment, over against Badiou’s positive assessment. 
The notion of the swerve itself seems relatively straightforward—
straightforward enough, in fact, to draw the ridicule of critics. Cicero 
famously mocked Epicurus as follows:  
Then this clever fellow, when it occurred to him that if 
they [the atoms] all moved directly down and, as I said, in 
a straight line, it would never come about that one atom 
could make contact with another and so . . . he introduced 
a fictitious notion: he said that an atom swerves by a very 
little bit, indeed a minimal distance, and that in this way 
are produced the mutual entanglements, linkages, and 
cohesions of the atoms as a result of which the world and 
all the parts of the world and everything it are produced.67 
From Cicero’s perspective, “the swerve itself is made up to suit [the 
atomist’s] pleasure,” serving to patch up a rather embarrassing oversight, 
and Epicurus only described it as “without a cause” in order to maintain, 
entirely unconvincingly, consistency regarding the basic principles of the 
world (atoms and void).68 Karl Marx, for his part, was less than impressed 
J o s e p h  M .  S p e n c e r  |  1 1 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIII, No 2 (2015)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2015.691 
with Cicero’s simplistic dismissal: “The declinatio atomorum a via recta 
[deviation of the atoms from the straight line] is one of the most profound 
conclusions,” he wrote in his early notebooks on atomism. “Cicero might 
well laugh at it, he knew as little about philosophy as about the president of 
the United States of North America.”69 Marx famously developed a 
(Hegelian) dialectical interpretation of the swerve at great length in his 
doctoral thesis.70 Badiou clearly follows Marx in this regard, finding 
extremely subtle dialectical insight operative in the ancient account of the 
swerve. But for Badiou, the swerve also quivers at the border between the 
structural and the materialist dialectics. In the hands of the atomists 
themselves, ultimately, the swerve serves principally to “filter the strong 
difference into a weak difference,” that is, to replace genuine heterogeneity 
(atoms and void) with “a homogeneous combinatory space, wherein a 
process becomes composed with terms of the same kind.”71 
 Following Marx’s dialectical reading, Badiou argues that the swerve of 
an atom constitutes an exception with respect to the law of pre-cosmic 
atomistic motion. And he insists that this insurrectionary status of the 
swerving atom “marks the void, since [this atom in particular] is affected by 
[the void] in a different way and not just in its generality as atom.”72 Better 
put, the swerving atom becomes something like the proper name of the 
void, the “atomistic designation of the void itself,” inasmuch as it uniquely 
(among atoms) relates to the void by deviating from the straight line.73 But 
as the bearer of the name of the void, the deviating atom relocates the 
absolute heterogeneity between atoms and void to a position among the 
atoms themselves, with one (the deviating atom) serving as the figure of the 
void and the others (the undeviating atoms) serving still as atoms. The 
strong difference between atoms and the void here becomes a weak 
difference, between one sort of atom (which names the void) and another 
sort of atom (which does not name the void). The void, in the meanwhile, 
“has dropped out.”74 
 This first dialectical move, however, does not spell disaster in and of 
itself. Indeed, Badiou finds in the insurrectionary swerve of the atom that 
designates the void a figure for every mass uprising, the revolt from within 
the constituted order. What marks the structural commitments of the ancient 
atomistic dialectic, according to Badiou, is the way it goes on to insist that 
not only the void but the very trace of the void—the swerving atom—must 
disappear (as vanishing cause of the formation of the cosmos). This the 
atomists accomplished by claiming that the swerve has no cause, that “no 
atom should ever be mappable as deviant, in any combination of atoms 
whatsoever, even though the existence of deviation conditions the very 
existence of a combinatory.”75 For the atomists with their structural 
investments, the insurrectionary cause born of chance must be erased, so that 
structure prevails. If, however, the swerve is handled differently—not erased 
but rendered consistent—its insurrectionary status prevails over structure and 
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genuine political revolution takes place.76 In the place of anxiety about the 
insurrection that one pretends has not happened, one inserts the courage 
necessary for pursuing the consequences of the chance happening of the 
uprising. And in the place of submission to the superegoic force that 
underlies the law of the situation, one inserts real commitment to the justice 
that should govern the process of developing consistency within the 
mobilized masses. 
 For Badiou, then, the political relevance of the atomists lies in the way 
they recognize—even if they subsequently attempt to conceal it—the 
insurrectionary force marked by the swerve, the interruptive flash of the 
void among the atoms. Where that force or that flash, and therefore the 
strong dialectical contradiction it harbors, finds subjects prepared to pursue 
its destructive consequences, the structural tendencies of atomism fall away, 
and a materialist periodizing dialectic unfolds. In the swerve, fully granted 
its interruptive position between the pre-cosmic motion of the atoms in the 
void and the full constitution of cosmic order, Badiou finds a figure for 
robust radical political subjectivity. And although he has not used the set of 
images provided by ancient atomism in his more recent work, it is precisely 
this picture of things that still prevails, with the swerve now figured by the 
concept of the event.77 But what, for his part, does Rancière find in the 
swerve? Given the manner in which he assigns a positive value to the pre-
cosmic rain of the atoms in parallel in the void, it should be unsurprising 
that his assessment of the swerve, only subtly hinted at in The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster, is ultimately negative. Put in a nutshell, Rancière’s position is 
that the swerve marks the failure of the community of equals, the beginning 
of the process of agglomeration that brings into being a social order with its 
hierarchies. 
 I have already made clear that Rancière draws both his negative 
assessment of the atomists’ cosmos and his positive assessment of the 
atomists’ pre-cosmic rain from the writings of Jacotot. He does not seem to 
have found in Jacotot, however, any clear assessment of the swerve that 
marks the beginning of the process that leads from the one to the other. This 
he provides himself, rather. I want to suggest that Rancière works out his 
assessment of the swerve when he assigns to the gesture that disrupts the 
equality of intelligence and therefore the community of equals the name of 
distraction. Although he never makes fully clear the connection between this 
choice of words and his interest in atomism in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, it is 
fully appropriate that the term brings together Rancière’s attempts to 
describe the work of an intelligence under the tutelage of a will and the 
atomistic imagery of the atoms’ rain, their diversion or distraction, and their 
agglomeration. And it should be noted that Rancière first makes distraction 
a theme in close connection with his analysis of Jacotot’s two passages on 
atomism. It is there, for instance, that he describes “simple distraction” as, 
rather suggestively, “original sin.”78 
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 In order to make sense of distraction, however, one should turn to 
earlier parts of the book. Already in the second lesson, Rancière assigns the 
name of “attention” to “the act that makes an intelligence proceed under the 
absolute constraint of a will.”79 When one pays attention, one fully mobilizes 
her intelligence—equal to that of all others—through her will, whether her 
will has enough force on its own to accomplish the mobilization or whether 
her will has to be propped up by the imposition of the will of an 
emancipatory master.80 Attention thus arises where the will removes 
intelligence from every assumed hierarchy, from every social order, in order 
to set it quite freely to work on the world. “Attention” is a Rancièrean name 
for the rain of the atoms in parallel trajectories in the void. Distraction, in 
turn, arises when attention flags, when the will’s constraint releases itself 
and allows an intelligence to turn from its task to self-conscious 
contemplation of its place in a socially-determined hierarchy. “Distraction” 
is thus a Rancièrean name—perhaps the Rancièrean name—for the swerve 
that interrupts the parallel rain of the atoms in the void and begins the 
process of agglomeration that results eventually in a social order, with all its 
inequities. Distraction is the origin of the social order. It is, as Rancière says, 
the “original sin,” the work of the subtle serpent who disrupts the paradise 
of the community of equals to lay the foundations for the world of inequity 
and oppression, the world where the threat of death leads to every sort of 
evil. 
 If, as Rancière puts it, “there need only be distraction for intelligence 
to give way, for it to be overcome by the gravitation of matter” and so to fall 
from its orbit or to be diverted from its parallel motion with all other atoms 
in the void,81 it could not be clearer that the swerve is, for Rancière, the 
principal evil. Far from being a figure for political insurrection, as it is in 
Badiou, it serves in Rancière’s thought as a figure for the failure of every 
political insurrection, the dissipation of every “logical revolt.”82 Rather than 
marking the occurrence of chance in an otherwise total order, the swerve 
marks for Rancière the slide from the anarchy of the atomistic rain in the 
void to the irrationality of the social order. Where the purified mastery of 
emancipation, the direct relationship of will to will without any admixture 
of intellectual hierarchy, holds sway, no deviation from the community of 
equals occurs. But where such mastery, whether inter- or intrapersonal in 
nature, flags, intelligences become distracted, and the social order supplants 
the community of equals. 
 Although this difference between Badiou and Rancière in their 
respective appropriations of atomism more easily escapes notice than that 
explored in the previous section, it should be said that it is more significant 
than the other—and certainly more telling. Only here does it become quite 
clear that both Rancière and Badiou mean to find in atomism some figure for 
the revolt of the masses, but that they entirely disagree about where that 
figure is to be found in the atomists’ cosmological picture. What Badiou 
1 1 4  |  R a n c i è r e a n  A t o m i s m  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIII, No 2 (2015)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2015.691 
rejects as an image of historyless nature Rancière takes up as an image of the 
community of equals in anarchic but rational revolt. And what Rancière 
rejects as an image of irrational distraction and concession to the prevalence 
of social order Badiou takes up as an image of the mass revolt that opens 
onto the possibility of just transformation. What marks their strongest point 
of difference concerns the question of whether the swerve figures resistance 
to suffocatingly strict order or whether it figures the collapse of resistance to 
suffocatingly strict order. 
 This helps in an important way to clarify Rancière’s ready response to 
Badiou’s criticism, discussed already in the conclusion to the preceding 
section of this paper. Because a specific operation of mastery—albeit never 
of intellectual mastery—proves necessary to ward off the distraction that 
undermines the community of equals, it seems Badiou is simply wrong to 
accuse Rancière of presenting a political picture of “a shared mastery 
without a master position.”83 More importantly, however, this difference of 
opinion regarding the political relevance of the atomistic swerve helps to 
clarify Rancière’s own critique of Badiou, worked out explicitly in much 
more recent publications. The essence of Rancière’s criticisms lies in his 
accusation that Badiou consistently attempts to curb the link between art as 
understood since the mid-eighteenth century and mass politics. Regarding 
art and politics as distinct truth procedures and then assigning to 
philosophy the task of articulating that distinction, Badiou grants to 
philosophers a position of intellectual mastery that renders the political 
significance of the individual’s orbit around the truth inaccessible to that 
same individual.84 This reinstalls, against all of Badiou’s radical political 
intentions, the intractable force of the social order, according to Rancière, 
because it grants legitimacy to the same sense of intellectual hierarchy that 
undergirds the idea of social order as such. 
 How, though, is this clarified by the debate of sorts between Badiou 
and Rancière on the nature of the atomistic swerve? For both Badiou and 
Rancière, the swerve marks a moment of non-reason, of the unaccountable 
as such. And both insist that whatever is genuinely politically productive 
must bear within itself an essentially rational moment. What ultimately 
distinguishes their respective approaches to the swerve is the way each 
regards the relationship between the unreason of the swerve and the reason 
of true politics. For Badiou, the moment of reason comes in the process of 
rendering consistent the unreason of the insurrection. It comes, in other 
words, in the reason-driven process of giving to the revolt of the masses 
consistency enough to produce genuine transformation, genuine revolution. 
For that reason, Badiou makes the atomistic swerve the figure of 
insurrection, which must be rendered consistent in a separate and 
subsequent process. For Rancière, however, the moment of reason lies 
within the (logical) revolt itself, the insurrection being nothing other than 
the mobilization of (equal) intelligence by the will. It comes, in other words, 
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in the anarchy of thought, entirely inconsistent and irreducible to any social 
ordering, even in transformation or revolution. For that reason, Rancière 
makes the atomistic swerve the figure of the insurrection’s failure, the 
dissipation of the revolt as reason gives way to unreason. 
 Importantly, for each thinker, some figure of mastery serves to ensure 
that reason has its rightful place in relationship to unreason. But the figure 
of mastery is distinct in each case. For Badiou, the master appears in the 
form of the thinker who, in the wake of insurrection and its unreason, takes 
up from a position of intellectual superiority the task of rendering the 
insurrectionary cause consistent enough to have real purchase on the 
situation in which it had its origins. For Rancière, the master appears in the 
form of the emancipator who instigates insurrection and its reason by setting 
her own intelligence aside to establish a hierarchical linkage of wills that 
frees up otherwise servile intelligences. Both thinkers ultimately work at 
cross purposes with the atomists, whether because—as with Badiou—they 
satisfy themselves with dialectically erasing rather than rendering consistent 
the swerve that ontologically figures political insurrection, or whether 
because—as with Rancière—they privilege rather than contest the swerve 
and the cosmic constitution it sets in motion over the pre-cosmic rain that 
ontologically figures logical revolt. 
Conclusion 
 In the end, it must of course be said that Badiou and Rancière 
approach and appropriate atomistic thought quite differently. Yet certain 
similarities in their understandings make it possible for close comparative 
work on their uses of atomism to illuminate the debate that has organized 
their ongoing relationship. Both see in the atomists’ constituted cosmos a 
figure for the consistency of situations, for social orders as such. And both 
see in the atomists’ swerve a certain moment of essential non-reason that 
plays some role in leading to the production of any particular social order. 
What ultimately distinguishes them here as elsewhere is whether they 
regard political insurrection as rational or irrational in nature, and therefore 
how they understand the role of mastery to see that insurrection 
accomplishes genuinely politically productive aims. Should the atomistic 
swerve figure insurrection or its failure? Is revolt logical, or is it the illogical 
par excellence? This, it seems, is the central question of what has rightly 
been called, recently, the French philosophical tradition of “left atomism.” 
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